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Abstract
Though not exempt from the impacts of national practice and thinking, the European Com-
munity (”EC”) is favored by bonds of law stronger than in other international organizations. The
European Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields. The subjects of this
new legal order are not only Member States but also their nationals. Independent of the legisla-
tion of Member States, Community law, therefore, not only imposes obligations on individuals,
but also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. The EC
Treaty, although concluded by way of an international convention, nevertheless represents the
constitutional document of a community of law. The essential characteristics of the Community’s
legal order are the precedence of Community law over the law of the Member States and the direct
effect of its provisions on the Member States and their nationals. . . . Legal cohesion in the Eu-
ropean Community is essentially weakened if a conflict arises between the European Community
and national courts over the competence to deny the validity or applicability of Community law
and the scope of constitutional rules. A study of the relationship between the European Court of
Justice and the German Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht (“Constitutional
Court”), presents this scenario.
A COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL COHESION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Manfred Zuleeg*
I. THE NOTION OF LEGAL COHESION
The European Union unites nation states which were some
decades ago more or less isolated from each other and partly
hostile to each other. The purpose of European integration is to
prevent the evils of nationalism. To this end, the founders of the
European Communities established, through a series of treaties'
("Foundation Treaties"), a supranational power which now
makes up the core of the European Union. The preambles to
the Foundation Treaties indicate that the integration of nation
states into a supranational entity should establish a stable peace
in Europe, serve the common interests, and promote economic
and social progress of the European peoples. The success of this
endeavor depends on the readiness of the Member States to re-
nounce their traditional concept of sovereignty. Presently, ten-
dencies designed to restore the old order of international rela-
tions are perceptible. While it is true that centrifugal forces also
exist within some nation states, in general the nation guarantees
politically that such forces do not lead to the destruction of the
state.
The European Union, comprised of fifteen nations, lacks
the political will expressed by a single European people to keep
* Dr. iur., Professor of Public Law, especially European and Public International
Law, at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt on Main, former Judge at
the European Court ofJustice in Luxembourg, and Visiting Professor at the University
of California, Berkeley.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty] as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA] in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNrnEs (EC Ofrl Pub. Off. 1987). Until 1995, the twelve EU Member States were
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl. On January 1,
1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became Member States of the European Union. See
Hugh Carney, Sweden Gives Clear Yes to EU Vote in Favour of Membership Keeps Enlargement
Timetable on Course, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at 1 (discussing accession of new states).
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together in spite of oncoming difficulties. In such a situation,
Europe is mainly tied together by the political will of the Mem-
ber States which may be diminished by various reasons.
Although political participation of the European peoples repre-
sented in the European Parliament compensates the weakness of
the system to an increasing extent, it is still far from counter-
vailing the resistance of a national government to European inte-
gration.
Additional support for a united Europe may be brought
about by the benefits from the Foundation Treaties and from
the policies of EC institutions, especially by economic or social
advantages for individuals of similar economic or social situa-
tions. In "Euro-jargon", the appropriate expression for this ef-
fect is "economic and social cohesion" as used in Article 130a of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty") .2 According to Article 130a, in order to promote its
overall harmonious development, the European Community
shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening
of its economic and social cohesion.' This provision conceals
the redistributive policies of the European Community. Never-
theless, the notion may be extended to other economic and so-
cial benefits.
Even if the Member States are willing to fulfill the require-
ments of European integration, they are often prone to give in
to internal pressures to counter exigencies from the outside.
Moreover, national egoism or dogma may cause the reluctance
of a Member State or an individual to abide by the imperatives of
the European Union. Traditional international law suffers
under these deficiencies caused by the dominance of the system
and the idea of nation states. Treaties in general are not as ef-
fective as internal national law.
In the European Community, the situation is different.
Though not exempt from the impacts of national practice and
thinking, the European Community is favored by bonds of law
stronger than in other international organizations. The Euro-
pean Community constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which Member States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields. The subjects of this
2. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
3. Id., art. 130a, 1 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
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new legal order are not only Member States but also their na-
tionals. Independent of the legislation of Member States, Com-
munity law, therefore, not only imposes obligations on individu-
als, but also intended to confer upon them rights which become
part of their legal heritage.4 The EC Treaty, although con-
cluded by way of an international convention, nevertheless rep-
resents the constitutional document of a community of law. The
essential characteristics of the Community's legal order are the
precedence of Community law over the law of the Member
States5 and the direct effect of its provisions on the Member
States and their nationals. 6
The EC Treaty has established its own system of law which
must be applied by the courts of the Member States.7 It would
be contrary to the nature of such a system to allow Member
States to introduce or to retain measures capable of prejudice to
the practical effectiveness of the EC Treaty. The binding force
of the EC Treaty and of measures taken in application of it must
not differ from one Member State to another as a result of inter-
nal measures, lest the functioning of the Community system
should be impeded and the achievement of the aims of the EC
Treaty placed in peril. Consequently, conflicts between the rules
of the European Community and national rules must be re-
solved by applying the principle that Community law takes pre-
cedence.' Thus, the particular traits of the Community's legal
order may be characterized generally by the concepts of unity,
effectiveness, precedence, and direct effect.
Unity of Community law would not persist were there not a
court applying, or at least interpreting, this law in the same way
throughout the European Community. This task is primarily the
4. SeeVan Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Case 26/62, (1963]
E.C.R. 1, 26, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105, 122.
5. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591. Article 5 states:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or
resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any message which could jeopardize the objec-
tives of this Treaty.
Id.
6. Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area I, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, 6102.
7. See Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 26, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 122.
8. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Cae No. 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, 14, [1969] 8
C.M.L.R. 100, 118-19.
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responsibility of the Court ofJustice of the European Communi-
ties ("ECJ," "Court of Justice," or "Court"). 9 The European
Community itself, the Member States, and their inhabitants are
subject to the Court's authority. According to Article 164 of the
EC Treaty, the Court shall ensure observance of laws through
the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty.' °
Without a judicial power, Community law would be
threatened by subsequent practice of the Member States and the
aims of the Foundation Treaties and their amendments would
be unattainable.' In order to prevent such a situation, the
Foundation Treaties instill powers in the ECJ which are likely to
combat such a development. These powers include, most impor-
tantly, the infringement procedure and the procedure of prelim-
inary rulings.
The latter type of jurisdiction fosters cooperation between
the ECJ and the courts of the Member States.12 In cases that
national courts refer to the ECJ, the ECJ decides only upon cer-
tain elements of the litigation, namely the validity and the inter-
pretation of Community law. The national courts consider the
rest.
Under the procedure of preliminary rulings, the national
courts function as Community courts. The founders of the Eu-
ropean Community have thereby invented an effective tool to
separate the observance of Community law from political inter-
ventions. The political forces in the Member States continue to
influence Community law and its impact on citizens, but policy is
restricted to a change of the rules. The conclusion therefrom is
that economic and social cohesion, as well as legal cohesion, are
inherent to the European Community. As long and as far as Ar-
ticle L of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") excludes the
9. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") is the highest authority on the interpretation of Community
Law. Id.
10. Id.
11. See JORGEN SCHWARZE, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT oF JusTICE IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF UNIFORM LAW AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES (1988).
12. Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 16/
65, [1965] E.C.R. 1151, 1165; Michele Ferrer Lederer, Case C-147/91, [1992] E.C.R. I-
4097, 4115; see generally, Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling
Procedure, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 388 (1995) (detailing role and purpose of ECJ prelimi-
nary rulings).
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Court's jurisdiction over the TEU, t3 legal cohesion does not
work in the European Union.14
II. THE CONFIJCT OF COURTS
Legal cohesion in the European Community is essentially
weakened if a conflict arises between the European Community
and national courts over the competence to deny the validity or
applicability of Community law and the scope of constitutional
rules. A study of the relationship between the ECJ and the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht
("Constitutional Court"), presents this scenario.
The debate again concerns the protection of fundamental
rights. The first struggle over fundamental rights broke out in
1974 when the Constitutional Court proclaimed in a case known
as Solange I that any German court must refuse to apply Commu-
nity law if it conflicted with fundamental rights derived from the
German Constitution, the Fundamental Law, Grundgesetz.15 The
Constitutional Court added the proviso that this rule is binding
as long as Community integration has not reached a stage at
which a catalogue of fundamental rights, comparable to the one
included in the Fundamental Law, is set up by a parliament for
Europe. Three judges dissented. For them, the EC protection
of fundamental rights was sufficient.
In Solange I, Community law was not affected. The Constitu-
tional Court held that the Community rule in question was up to
the standard of the Fundamental Law, but in principle Commu-
nity law from then on was at the discretion of the German
courts. The dissenting vote, however, showed that at the time,
the ECJ had already established a system of fundamental rights
equivalent to that of the Fundamental Law.' 6 It is a myth that
Solange /"7 encouraged the ECJ to incorporate fundamental
rights into Community law. Beginning in 1969, the ECJ had de-
veloped the protection of fundamental rights based on the com-
13. TEU, supra note 3, art. L, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 738.
14. See Manfred Zuleeg, Der Rechtliche Zsammenhalt der Europdischen Gemeinschaft, 3
ZErrSCHRiFr FOR EUROPAISCHES PR-VATREcHT 475-97 (1963) (presenting more extensive
study of legal cohesion in European Community).
15. Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (F.R.G.)
[herinafter Solange I]. The German word solange means "as long as."
16. Id. at 291, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 555.
17. Id. at 285, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 551.
627
628 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:623
mon constitutional tradition of the Member States and of trea-
ties on human rights concluded by them. 18
The fragile coexistence of two schemes of protection of fun-
damental rights with potential conflicts lasted up to the year
1986. In a case known as Solange II, the Constitutional Court
decided that it would no longer review the acts of the Commu-
nity institutions for violations of fundamental rights granted by
the German Constitution. As long as the European Community,
especially the ECJ, guarantees an effective protection of funda-
mental rights, and this protection is essentially equivalent to the
fundamental rights of the Fundamental Law, control by German
courts is restricted to the question of whether Community law
generally attains the level of the unrenounceable essence of pro-
tection accorded by German constitutional law.' 9
Not merely armistice, but even peace seemed to be achieved
between the European Community and the German jurisdic-
tions, at least for the Second Senate of the Constitutional
Court."° In 1992, the First Senate of the Constitutional Court
followed the decision of the Second Senate. If a German law,
like the law prohibiting work at night for women, is inapplicable
as assessed by the ECJ because of discrimination against women,
a reference by a German court to the Constitutional Court is
inadmissible because the Constituional Court recognizes the ju-
risdiction of the ECJ. German law is no longer relevant for the
decision of the inferior court.21
The peace was brusquely interrupted in 1993 by the Judg-
ment of the Second Senate on the accession of Germany to the
TEU in what is known as the Maastrichtjudgment.22 With regard
to fundamental rights, the Second Senate cited only the restric-
tion of the abandonment ofjudicial review of Community acts by
German courts from the judgment known as Solange II and not
the abandonment itself. Subsequently, the Second Senate
18. Stauder v. City of UIm, Sozialamt, Case 26/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, [1970]
C.M.L.R. 112; Internationale Hendelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255.
19. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986 Wunsche Handelsgeselleschaft, 73 BVerfGE 339, 376,
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 275 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange II].
20. The Constitutional Court is composed of two Senates, comprised of chambers
of eight judges deciding independently from each other.
21. 85 BverfGE 191, 203 (F.R.G.);following Stoeckel, Case C-345/89, [1991] E.C.R.
1-4047, 4067.
22. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BverfGE 155 (F.R.G.).
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claimed that the Constitutional Court may control any sovereign
power whatsoever exerted on German soil, including acts of a
supranational organization. Curiously enough, the Second Sen-
ate classified this claim as a modification of a decision concern-
ing Eurocontrol,23 but not of Solange II, despite that this judg-
ment explicitly refrained from a review of Community acts, after
having extensively demonstrated that the EC standard of protec-
tion is equivalent to the German one.24
The Second Senate continues by the presentation of a "rela-
tion of cooperation" between the ECJ and the Constitutional
Court which, however, is not identical to the procedure of pre-
liminary rulings. The new sort of cooperation means that the
ECJ is guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights in
each case for the whole territory of the European Community
while the Constitutional Court may restrict itself to ensure the
indispensable fundamental rights standard.25
These cryptic sentences give rise to the assumption that the
Second Senate had in mind a kind of guardianship of the Consti-
tutional Court over the ECJ.26 Similarly, the Constitutional
Court confers to itself jurisdiction over acts of Community insti-
tutions in order to check whether these institutions remain
within the limits of sovereign powers attributed to them or
whether they break out of these limits. The judgment of the
First Senate on the work of women at night was not even
deemed worthwhile of mention by the Second Senate.
The Administrative Court of Frankfurt on Main ("Adminis-
trative Court") allows the Constitutional Court the opportunity
to realize its intention to control Community acts. The Adminis-
trative Court must decide on the distribution of quotas concern-
ing the import of bananas from third countries into the Euro-
pean Community. The authority administering the licences to
import bananas from third countries into Germany refused the
allocation of such a licence to an import firm on the base of the
so-called Bananas Regulation.2 7 The Administrative Court re-
23. Judgment of June 23, 1981, Eurocontrol, 58 BVerfGE 1, 27 (F.R.G.).
24. Solange II, 73 BVerfGE at 378, 386-87 (F.R.G.).
25. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE at 175; see 33 I.L.M. 388 (1994) (pro-
viding English translation ofjudgment).
26. See Christian Tomuschat, Die Europdische Union unter der Aufsicht des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIIr 489-96 (1993).
27. Council Regulation No. 404/93, O.J. L47/1 (1993).
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ferred the case to the Constitutional Court and asked it whether
the Regulation is compatible with the fundamental rights as
guaranteed by the Fundamental Law." Thus, the conflict went
into an acute stage.
The Second Senate of the Constitutional Court, which has
the authority to decide such questions, has already indicated its
view on this issue. Upon a constitutional complaint from an im-
porter of third-country bananas, the Appellate Administrative
Court of Kassel, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, reversed a decision
which had refused an interim order allocating additional
licences. The Constitutional Court cited an infringement of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Fundamental Law guaranteeing the right to prop-
erty as a fundamental right. Provisional legal protection might
not be granted in time by another authority. Thus, the right to
judicial review would also be violated. 9
The ECJ in Port v. Bundesanstalt° recently countered that it
alone has the authority to review the legality of Community insti-
tutions' action or inaction. The Community institutions are re-
quired to act when the transition to the common organization of
the banana market infringes upon certain traders' fundamental
rights which are protected by Community law, such as the right
to property and the right to pursue a professional or trade activ-
ity. The Court of Justice repeated the exceptions established in
former judgments.3'
The Court of Justice acknowledged that national courts
have the power to grant interim relief when implementing a na-
tional measure based on a Community regulation. That power
may only be exercised under strict conditions ensuring the effec-
tiveness of the Community's legal order but, at the same time,
safeguarding the protection of individual rights as far as neces-
sary.
Regarding the procedure of preliminary rulings, the ECJ
28. Decision of 24 Oct. 1996, reference No. 1 E 798/95 (V).
29. BverfG, 1st Chamber of the 2d Senate, Decision of 25 Jan. 1995, Cases 2 BuR
2689/94 and 2 BuR 52/95, 49 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHIuF 950 (1995).
30. Port v. Bundesanstalt for Landwirtschaft und Ernihrung, Case C-68/95 (Eur.
Ct. J. Nov. 26, 1996) (not yet reported).
31. Zuckerfabrik Sfiderdithmarschen v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, Case C-143/88,
[1991] E.C.1L 1-415, 541; Atlanta v. Bundesamt ffir Erndhrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case
C-465/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3761, 3794-95, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 575, 596-97.
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cited Factortame.31 In Factortame, the ECJ held that the national
court, which had referred questions of interpretation for a pre-
liminary ruling in order to enable it to decide whether a national
measure was compatible with Community law, must be able to
grant interim relief and suspend the application of the disputed
national action until it could deliver its judgment based on the
interpretation given in accordance with Article 177 of the EC
Treaty. 3
The ECJ continued, however, by stating that the situation
raised by the national court in Port v. Bundesanstalt differs from
the situation at issue in Factortame.4 The present case is not
about granting interim measures in the context of the national
implementation of a Community regulation whose validity is be-
ing contested in order to ensure interim protection of rights
which individuals derive from the Community legal system.3 5
Rather, it is about granting traders interim judicial protection in
a situation where, by virtue of a Community regulation, the exist-
ence and scope of traders' rights must be established by a Com-
mission measure which the Commission has not yet adopted. In
such a situation, only the Court of Justice or the Court of First
Instance, as the case may be, can ensure judicial protection for
the persons concerned.
Regulation No. 404/93 establishing a common organization
of the banana market provides for a special procedure empower-
ing the Commission to take measures to assist the transition
from the arrangements existing before the entry into force of
this Regulation to those implemented by this Regulation. The
Court of Justice designated such transitional measures as the ap-
propriate means to tackle the hardship cases alleged by the
plaintiff. Consequently, there is no need for interim measures of
the national courts.36
The plaintiff has already announced that the procedure
before the Constitutional Court must continue. The abstract
claim of the Constitutional Court to review Community acts ex-
pressed in the Maastricht judgment may now become concrete.
32. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited, Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Factortame].
33. Id.
34. Port v. Bundesanstalt, Case C-68/95 (not yet reported).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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The Court of Justice, on the other hand, strictly interdicts all
sorts of judicial review of Community acts by national courts in
the field of the common market for bananas. In this way, the
conflict has become imminent. It may, however, be that the
Constitutional Court will exercise control over Community acts
but will reach the conclusion that fundamental rights are not
affected due to the possibility that import firms may get relief
through transitional measures implemented by the Commission
through the ECJ. The replay of Solange I would be striking.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE RULE OF LAW
The conflict of national courts within the European Com-
munity is provoked by the Constitutional Court's claim to review
Community acts. The highest German court strives for a mini-
mal guarantee of protection of fundamental rights as they are
formulated in the German Constitution and shaped by the Con-
stitutional Court itself. No urgent need, however, is detectible.
After Solange II, the standard of protection of fundamental rights
by EC Courts has not been lowered. To the contrary, both the
system of fundamental rights and their extent have been com-
pleted. The ECJ requires an effective judicial protection of fun-
damental rights. Cooperation between the ECJ with the national
courts is mandated in the framework of preliminary rulings
under Article 177 of the EC Treaty.
The system of protection of fundamental rights in the Euro-
pean Community closely resembles the German one, except for
a catalogue in the Constitution. Differences may arise by balanc-
ing a specific fundamental right against others or against a pub-
lic interest like the establishment of a common market of ba-
nanas. Regarding the right to property, the European Commu-
nity and the German courts agree that this right does not
include the mere expectation to get profits. In Germany, how-
ever, total deprivation of earnings is considered a prejudice to
property, whereas the ECJ excludes profits entirely from the pro-
tection of the right to property. But the right to exercise a pro-
fessional or trade activity remains applicable, so the tradesman
enjoys the protection of at least one fundamental right.3 7 The
intensity of protection of a certain fundamental right may di-
37. Germany v. Council, Case C-280/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973, 5065-66, [hereinaf-
ter Common Market of Bananas].
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verge from the European Community to the Member State, but
reciprocally another right or a public interest may gain less or
more weight. This is no sufficient reason to correct the Commu-
nity system by national measures.
The Maastricht judgment of the Constitutional Court dem-
onstrates that there is more at stake than the optimal protection
of fundamental rights. On German territory, not only must the
sovereign powers of national authorities be subordinated to the
ultimate control of the Constitutional Court, but also those of a
supranational organization must be subordinated.38 The idea
behind this demand is nothing else than the traditional concept
of sovereignty. The state is and must continue to be the highest
authority on national soil. A member of the Second Senate, who
as ReportingJudge wrote the Maastrichtjudgment of the Consti-
tutional Court, spoke about the necessity of maintaining na-
tional identities.3 9 His statement is revealing. He does not care
about the independent authority of the European Community
and its own legal order. He ignores the prerogatives of the Euro-
pean Parliament representing the peoples of the Member States
and the powers of the Community to issue acts with binding
force on the Member States.4"
The third consideration of the Preamble to the Maastricht
Treaty confirms the attachment to the principles of liberty, de-
mocracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.4 ' In the German version, the rule of law is
called Rechtsstaatlichkeit, a notion derived from the Rechtsstaat,
the state of law. The ECJ transformed this notion into Recht-
38. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE at 175.
39. Paul Kirchhof, Der deutsche Staat im Prozefi der eumpdischen Integration, in
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, vol. VII, 855 (Josef
Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1992). Kirchhof stated:
The constitution empowers or obliges the State to bind herself externally in
the Community of Nations, to conclude special treaties or to exercise her sov-
ereignty only in concordance with other States by means of a membership in
an interstate institution. Therefore, the European States at present do not
shield themselves from other States or nationals of other States, but they main-
tain their originality in a people related by birth and descent, by a territory
belonging to themselves, and by a cultural community of language, religion,
art and historic experience.
Id. at 866 (Author's translation).
40. SeeJ.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos, and
the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219-58 (1995).
41. TEU, supra note 1, pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 1 (1992), [1992], C.M.L.R. at 719.
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sgemeinschaft, community of law, enabling it to apply its meaning
to the European Community. The Fundamental Law, in Article
23, requires Rechtsstaatlichkeit of the European Union as a condi-
tion of Germany joining the European Union.
First of all, the rule of law demands that one abide with the
law. According to Article 177, paragraph 3 of the EC Treaty, a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law shall bring the
matter before the ECJ whenever a question of validity or inter-
pretation of Community law is raised in a case pending before
the court or tribunal.4" The treaty-making parties thereby mo-
nopolized the judicial review of the validity of Community acts
with the ECJ. The Constitutional Court, although it is the high-
est court in Germany, is not exempt from the obligation stem-
ming from the EC Treaty to refer questions of validity to the ECJ.
The referring court is bound by the answer. There is no oppor-
tunity left to escape from the subordination of the national
court. It is true that the EC institutions may not exert powers
that are ultra vires, but it is up to the ECJ to trace the limits. The
Constitutional Court restricts its review to the applicability of
Community acts in Germany. This restraint does not alter the
legal situation because the ban on application is tantamount to
invalidity. The Community act concerned loses its effectiveness.
The end result is that the Constitutional Court by its own is
neither competent to assess the invalidity of a Community act
nor to declare the inapplicability of such an act. Secondly, the
principle of equality is an essential element of the rule of law.
The Court of Justice deduces from special prohibitions of dis-
criminations in the Foundation Treaties that Community law
contains a general principle of this kind.4" Consequently, all
those who are affected by the sovereign powers of the Commu-
nity institutions must be treated equally. A national court, even
a constitutional court, is not authorized to erode the effective-
ness of the principle by an exemption for its country. A constitu-
tional court should be particularly sensitive to this aspect of the
problem. The Member States are included into the protection
by the principle of equality. They may not be forced to tolerate
42. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
43. Klensch v. Staatssekretdr ffir Landwirtschaft und Weinbau, Joined Cases 201
and 202/85, [1986] E.C.R. 3477, 3507, (1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 151, 164-65.
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a deviation from a Community act in a certain Member State
due to the case law of its constitutional court.
Thirdly, the principle of equality is closely related to the
principle of uniformity of the Community's legal order. The lat-
ter principle is especially important for provisions of Community
law directly applicable in the Member States. These rules must
be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States from the
date of their entry into force and for as long as they continue in
force. These provisions are a direct source of rights and duties
for all those affected, whether Member States or individuals who
are parties to legal relationships under Community law.44 Inap-
plicability of Community acts by virtue of case law created by na-
tional courts in a certain Member State would split up the Com-
munity into provinces of different law and necessarily lead to a
loss of effectiveness of the Community's legal order. This result
is irreconcilable with the rule of law.
Fourth, in accordance with the principle of the precedence
of Community law, the relationship between provisions of the
Foundation Treaties and directly applicable measures of the in-
stitutions on the one hand, and the national law of the Member
State on the other, is such that those provisions and measures
not only render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provi-
sion of current national law by their entry into force, but also
preclude the valid adoption of new legislative measures to the
extent to which they would be incompatible with Community
provisions. Indeed, any recognition of the legality of national
legislative measures which encroach upon the exercise of Com-
munity legislative power or which are otherwise incompatible
with Community law would amount to a corresponding denial of
the obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by
Member States pursuant to the EC Treaty and would, thus, im-
peril the foundations of the European Community. The effec-
tiveness of Article 177 of the EC Treaty would be impaired if the
national courts were prevented from forthwith applying Commu-
nity law in accordance with the decisions of the Court of Justice.
It follows therefrom that every national court must, in a case
within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and
44. Minister for Finance v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.K. 629, 643-44,
18-19 [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 283; Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-2473, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. at 1.
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protect fights which Community law confers upon individuals
and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law
which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the
Community rule.45
After Simmenthal in 1978, the Court ofJustice has not reiter-
ated any preclusion of validity of national legislative measures,
but it has confirmed the principle of precedence of Community
law with the consequence that conflicting national law and acts
of Member State institutions are inapplicable.' Community law
even takes precedence over the constitutional law of the Mem-
ber States including the provisions on fundamental rights. Re-
course to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to
judge the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the
Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and
efficiency of Community law. The validity of such measures can
only be judged in the light of Community law. The law stem-
ming from the EC Treaty, an independent source of law, be-
cause of its very nature, cannot be overridden by rules of na-
tional law, however framed, without being deprived of its charac-
ter as Community law and without the legal basis of the
Community itself being questioned. Therefore, the validity of a
Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot
be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either funda-
mental rights as formulated by the constitution of that Member
State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.
Fundamental rights, however, are guaranteed by the Commu-
nity's legal system.47
German constitutional law supports the foregoing point of
view. The Rechtsstaat, though only mentioned in relation to the
constitutional structure of the Lnder, the Member States of the
Federation, is regarded as an unalterable constitutional princi-
ple of the Fundamental Law. Rechtsstaatlichkeit of the European
Union as a condition of German membership would be endan-
gered if the case law of the Constitutional Court could diminish
the rule of law within the European Community.
The clause on principles, which is unalterable even by
45. Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. at 644, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 1.
46. Nimz v. City of Hamburg, Case C-184/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-297, 1-321, [1992] 3
C.M.L.R. 699, 714.
47. Handelgesellschaft, [1970] E.C.R. at 1135, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283-84.
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amendments of the Fundamental Law in Article 79, paragraph 3,
refers only to Articles 1 and 20, omitting Articles 2 to 19 where
the details of the protection of fundamental rights are laid
down. Article 1 of the Fundamental Law declares that the dig-
nity of men is inviolable and ensures the binding force of funda-
mental rights on the legislative, executive, and judicial powers as
directly applicable law. Consequently, the actual version of the
provisions on fundamental rights may be amended. As far as the
fundamental rights in Community law differ from the German
system, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to apply the ac-
tual version of fundamental rights in German constitutional law
to Community acts.
Article 101, paragraph 1 of the Fundamental Law is inter-
preted as granting a fundamental right to get a law suit decided
by the court determined by law for such a litigation. The Consti-
tutional Court extends this right to the ECJ. If a German court
refrains from a reference to the ECJ under Article 177, para-
graph 3 of the EC Treaty, the party concerned may, by constitu-
tional complaint, appeal to the Constitutional Court for a review
of whether the failure to act was arbitrary.48 In one case, the
Constitutional Court even charged the Bundesfinanzhof, the high-
est financial court in Germany, of "objective arbitrariness" in
having omitted to ask for a preliminary ruling of the Court of
Justice.4 9 The Constitutional Court, in dealing with Community
acts allegedly violating fundamental rights, may not fall short of
the standard established by its own cited decisions. It would be
arbitrary to refuse the transfer of control to the exclusively com-
petent court.
If the Constitutional Court, nonetheless, persists in its claim
to review Community acts, this breach of the uniformity of the
Community's legal order would exemplify a lack of fidelity to the
European Union. Other Member States might follow. Those
without a constitutional jurisdiction would be incited to get rid
of unpleasant obligations under Community law by political ac-
tion. Legal cohesion would break up. The Constitutional Court
will find it a challenge to avoid such an outcome.50
48. 73 BverfGE at 366-70.
49. 75 BverfGE at 233-34.
50. See Ulrich Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the
Court of Justice and National Courts, 33 COMMON MAmRKT L. REv. 401-37 (1996) (com-
menting on treated problems).
